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1. Introduction  
This paper looks at the frequency and nature of litigation in the early years of 
the Canterbury settlement on the east coast of the South island of New 
Zealand. Because this was a new settlement in an area with virtually no pre-
existing European population (and few indigenous people), but was a part of a 
more developed colony with an existing institutional base of courts and of 
inherited and local law, it provides an unusual opportunity to obtain a picture 
of litigation in a new community which inherited, rather than developed, its 
legal institutions. 
 
This paper focuses on civil litigation in the Supreme Court of New Zealand, 
the superior court of record, and is based primarily on archival records 
available in Christchurch, particularly the Supreme Court Minute Book, 
supplemented by other archival material and by contemporary newspaper 
reports.  The termination date of the study, around the end of September 
1861, is dictated by changes in the recording of matters before the Supreme 
Court,  under which very many fewer details are entered into the Minute Book.  
 
I must begin with a caveat that  this paper does not attempt at all to deal with 
all cases before the courts in Canterbury – there is clearly a substantial body 
of disputes which were heard in the lower courts which fall outside the 
purview of this study; I have not looked at these, partly because it would 
extend this paper substantially; partly because of pressure of time, and partly 
because the documentary record is patchy enough to raise some doubts as to 
the possibility of ever establishing a sufficiently accurate picture.  
 
2. The context  
2.1  History and Geography  
Canterbury was unusual in that it was a planned settlement principally 
conceived and executed by private, rather than governmental, enterprise. The 
story is all the standard books, but may be sketched sufficiently here by 
saying that Canterbury was planned by its designers, the Canterbury 
Association, as a Wakefield-plan settlement, and at the same time an 
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Anglican colony.  The planners therefore intended a version of an idealised 
rural England, with the Association acquiring  cheaply a very large area of 
land, which it would sell off gradually, but at a “sufficient” price (in practice a  
substantial price), to capitalists who would thus providing the initial funds for 
the settlement’s development, while hardworking labourers would be kept to 
wage work by the relatively higher price of land, at least for some time – and 
then they could transmute themselves into a rural yeomanry who could further 
aspire to  progress by exploiting the work of further labourers brought out with 
the assistance of the moneys paid for the dear land. While the system worked 
as well, or as badly, in Canterbury as it did anywhere else, Wakefieldian 
theory was frustrated by the dreams of, and opportunities provided by, the 
pastoral age.  
 
Canterbury had, from its initial days, a substantial class of reasonably well-to-
do landowners and professionals who came out directly from England to live 
in the colony, and who often found themselves as landlords of farmers or 
small businesses, and often also provided loan finance, or other investment 
capital, for farms or businesses. In addition, and unusually for New Zealand, 
Canterbury had a significant number of “absentee” landlords – mostly the 
English based members of the Canterbury Association who had acquired land 
in the settlement in return for providing initial capital; some of these absentee 
landlords found litigation in the Supreme Court necessary to protect their 
interests.1 
 
The physical conditions of the Canterbury provided reasonably good 
conditions for the planned new settlement.  Most of the Canterbury area was 
flat or only gently rolling country; much of it in open tussock grassland, 
interspersed with large patches of native “bush” or forest.  Soils ranged form 
stony gravels to deep loans suitable for intensive agriculture; the drier tussock 
lands held out early promise for sheep farming. There was however a major 
problem with communications, in that only two good harbours served the 
settlement; Lyttleton (at one time Port Cooper) and Akaroa; both being these 
being separated from the broad plains by steep hillsides, then largely forest 
covered.  Travellers had initially only two options for travel from Lyttelton, for 
much of the period of this study the largest centre of the settlement for many 
years,  to Christchurch, the intended principal settlement of Canterbury, and 
soon to become its dominant centre.  There was a narrow winding track over 
a steep hill (“the Bridle Path”, still a resort of the more determined Sunday 
walkers), or to go by water around the coast and over a quite significant tidal 
bar at the mouth of the Avon river, which flowed through Christchurch. After a 
few years this was supplemented by a road over the hills, but until a rail tunnel 
was driven through between the centres in the late 1860s, transport was 
always difficult. Nor were communications much better over much of the 
Canterbury Plains, and the adjoining foothills, over which sheep farmers 
quickly spread, as the plains and foothills were streaked with rivers which, 
                                                          
1 See for example Scott  as attorney for Rt Hon William Drago Montague, Duke of Manchester v  
Fantham  25 May 1860 National Archioves of New Zealand, Christchurch branch (hereafter NZNA) 
CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 and  Wortley v Williams 5 July 1861 NZNA 
CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 
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although normally shallow, could rise in flood quickly and become impassable 
for days.  
 
There appears to have been a fairly consistent pattern of smaller farmers 
taking up land close to Christchurch – partly from a desire to supply the small 
town market where possible, partly because the richer and better-watered 
soils were principally closer to Christchurch.  
 
One other feature of the Canterbury area was undoubtedly attractive to the 
Canterbury Association and to colonists alike – Canterbury had only a very 
small indigenous population at the time of European settlement as the local 
iwi, Ngai Tahu, had been largely destroyed or driven out by raids from the 
north. As a result, the Canterbury pioneers could virtually ignore the Maori 
population and its interests, save in regard to three or four small communities.  
 
2.2. Development of the settlement 
The arrival of the “First Four Ships” in late 1850 brought several hundred 
Canterbury Association migrants, overtaking, though not overwhelming, the 
small European population then existing, mostly in small coastal communities  
as whalers or felling timber. By the end of 1853, the (settler) population of 
Canterbury was around 3,000; this rose substantially in 1854-55, slowed over 
the period 1856-67 and then increased ever more rapidly – initially as a result 
of further migration organised by the Canterbury Association, but also as a 
result of the success of the sheep farmers, which drew moneyed settlers from 
other areas of the colony and even from Australia.  A census in 1861 showed 
a (settler) population of 16,040; in the following year the population increased 
a further 25%2. An alternative measure of the development of the settlement 
is that while there were but three lawyers resident and practising in Lyttelton 
and Christchurch in 1851, there appear to have been eleven by 1857, and a 
further 13 joined the local profession between 1859 and 1861.3  
 
2.3 Legal and institutional context  
The New Zealand court structure over this period comprised two main 
institutions, the Resident Magistrate’s Court and the Supreme Court. The 
former, presided over by a paid, but not legally qualified, magistrate (or rarely, 
two unpaid Justices of the Peace) had a summary civil jurisdiction in civil 
cases to a value of £20; it also had a minor criminal jurisdiction, as well as a 
special role in dealing with cases involving Maori.  
 
The Supreme Court was a relatively unusual superior court for the time, in 
that its civil jurisdiction combined  encompassed both equity and the common 
law; it also dealt with issues as to wills and estates, and also had a 
supervisory power over lunatics. It was also the principal court for serious 
criminal matters.  One critical circumstance is that the first sittings of the 
                                                          
2
 Population data is taken from W J Gardener (ed) A History of Canterbury (Christchurch, Whitcombe & 
Tombs 1971) vol 2, p 64 and p323. In the years after this study finishes, development of the settlement 
was significantly affected by the flood of population firstly to the Otago goldfields (to the south of 
Canterbury) and, a few years later, by gold rushes on the West Coast, across the main mountain ranges 
from Canterbury, but commercially and administratively intertwined. 
3 Calculated from data in National Archives of NZ, Christchurch CAHX Ch244/1 Index of Barristers and 
Solicitors (Christchurch) prior to 1876. 
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Supreme Court in Canterbury were fleeting affairs, conducted at long intervals  
by a judge on circuit from Wellington. Not until 1858 did Canterbury have a 
resident Supreme Court Judge, with the appointment of Henry Barnes 
Gresson, an Irish lawyer formerly in practice in Christchurch.  In 1859 the 
Supreme Court began to sit in Christchurch, rather than Lyttelton.  
 
There were other minor courts such as a Court of Requests and a simple 
Justice of the Peace court, but neither loomed large in  Canterbury’s life. Nor, 
it seems, was there any significant effect within our time period, of the 
creation in 1858 of the District Court as an intermediate civil and criminal court 
– indeed no District Court Judge was appointed at this time to the Canterbury 
area.  The court was, however, later to take a significant case load from the 
Supreme Court in some areas of the country.4   
 
3.  Litigation – frequency and quantum 
3.1. Cases set down for hearing  
In considering the nature and frequency of Supreme Court litigation in 
Canterbury, we can have regard to three different measures.  
 
One is to take the simplest, and smallest,  sample – the cases which actually 
were set down for a defended hearing in the Supreme Court before judge and 
jury (a feature of the cases heard in Canterbury is that all bar one case (an 
estate matter5) heard in full court were jury matters.  If this criterion is taken,  
there are few cases indeed. In 1852, at the first sittings of the Supreme Court, 
three cases were heard – one a successful action by a lawyer to recover fees 
for professional services; one, by the same plaintiff, for libel – he was non-
suited;  and the last an action in negligence for the value of a horse which 
died while in the custody of the defendant.  It was two years before the 
Supreme Court sat again, and even then the November 1854 sittings were 
brief, as in all three cases brought (one in contract, two apparently to do with 
title to land) the parties had agreed that the defendant would consent to a 
verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the judge’s later decision on a specific point 
of law. 
 
Although the Supreme Court sat again in 1855, there were no defended civil 
cases, and in 1856 there was but one (an action for specific performance of a 
contract for sale of land).  The last occasion on which the Supreme Court was 
required to travel on circuit to make one of its “Angel’s visits“ (as a local paper 
described them)6 was in April 1857, when seven cases were set down for 
hearing. Of these three were settled and one was stood over. In two the 
defendant consented to judgment being entered for the sum claimed, and only 
in the last was any issue left for the court – and then only to formally order an 
agreed verdict for a sum of £1,000, subject to a decision by arbitrators to 
whom a matter was being referred. It is impossible to tell what the nature of 
the six cases thus terminated were, but it is probable that at least three, each 
                                                          
4
 Details of these courts can be found in  Spiller, Finn and Boast  A New Zealand Legal History 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1996) ch 5. 
5
 In re estate of Peter Haylock,heard 30 December 1854, see NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book 
Supreme Court 1852-1860 and Lyttlelton Times 2 December 1854. 
6
 Lyttlelton Times editorial, 25 April 1857  
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brought by a firm of merchants, involved actions for debt.7  Thus in the first 
five years of the period covered by this paper, the occasional visits of the 
Supreme Court occasioned but fourteen cases being set down for trial, and 
fewer than half of these actually proceeded to a verdict.  
 
The picture, at first sight, changed somewhat when the Canterbury settlement 
acquired a resident Judge in 1858.  Although in the first sittings of 1858 there 
were no civil cases, in a second sitting in October and November the court 
heard two defended cases, one of defamation8 and one for damages for 
assault (a third case, also of defamation, was withdrawn when the first failed; 
another case was settled and the fifth case set down for trial, relating to land 
title) had to be postponed as counsel was no longer available. The assault 
case, Baker v Schroder 9 was by far the longest running case of the entire 
period – running over seven days of hearings, and then ending with an 
equivocal verdict, whereby the plaintiff, an Anglican clergyman horsewhipped 
in a Wellington street outside his church, recovered £50 “in vindication of the 
law”, the jury not being able to agree on the defendant’s allegation in 
mitigation of damages that the horsewhipping was  because the plaintiff had 
indecently assaulted the defendant’s daughter. Yet neither Baker v Schroder 
nor the defamation cases can properly be called “Canterbury” litigation; they 
having both been transferred from Wellington because it was believed no 
impartial jury could be obtained there.   
 
In 1859 the dearth of local defended cases continued – although the Supreme 
Court had moved to quarterly sessions, rather than bi-annual ones. Only one 
civil case went to trial all year – a case in contract for the price of cattle 
supplied to a butcher.10  In 1860 the tally went up to five defended cases – 
two in contract, one in negligence, one for breach of an equitable obligation 
and one unknown.  In 1861 the tally went up to nine – the highest number in 
the period covered by this paper; of these  five were in contract, one 
concerned title to land, one was an action in trover  relating to livestock, one 
an action for seduction and one in trespass11 (this latter being the only case in 
the period where a jury verdict was later set aside and the case reheard, with 
a different outcome) and one, in form a civil action, for a penalty under the 
customs legislation.12  
 
                                                          
7
 In one of these, the defendant was a farmer named Alexander McBratney, who appears regularly as 
defendant in debt actions for at least the next five years.  
8 The defamation case, Bowler v McKenzie & Muir 18 November 1858 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute 
Book Supreme Court 1852-1860, reported Lyttelton Times 20 November 1858 presented the strange 
spectacle of counsel for the defendant newspaper publishers, one William Fox (later Premier of New 
Zealand) informing the jury that he personally was the author of the allegedly defamatory material, . In 
the same issue of the newspaper there appears a letter to the Editor from Fox, setting out material the 
judge had refused to permit to use in his closing address. 
9
 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860, reported Lyttelton Times 24 and 27 
November and 1 December 1858. 
10
 Field v Austin NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860; reported Lyttelton 
Times 14 December 1859. For other similar cases against butchers see section 5.3 below.  
11 Stephens v Woodford,7-8 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; 
reported Lyttelton Times,13 March 1861.  
12 McKellar v Craig 1 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; reported 
The Press July 6 1861 and Lyttelton Times 10 July 1861, discussed further section 4.4 below  
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In total then, the Supreme Court actually heard in civil sessions fewer than 
thirty local cases in nine years, a figure which must be judged small even 
allowing for the scanty population of the Canterbury region. 
 
3.2. Writs issued 
A totally different impression of the quantum of litigation is gained if account is 
taken of the number of writs issued by the Canterbury registry of the Supreme 
Court.13  The records are somewhat incomplete and at times a little unreliable, 
but they indicate that in 1852, the first year of the Canterbury Registry, a mere 
eleven writs were issued;  the numbers then dwindled to five in 1853, none in 
1854,  rose again to thirteen in 1855, dropped again to seven in 1857 and a to 
mere six in 1858. While these small numbers initially may indicate the lack of 
a resident Judge, and a consequent belief that lodging a case might be futile,  
this cannot be the explanation for the low figures in 1858, and the explanation 
must lie elsewhere.  
 
The subsequent years were very different – in 1859 something in the order of 
207 writs were issued;  somewhere in the order of 290 the following year, and 
about 240 in the first  nine months of 1861. It may be noted that that these 
figures do not include any matters relating to probate, administration or the 
control of lunatics and their property.   
 
3.3. Minute Book count  
Lastly, there is the measure, which I would contend is probably the most 
accurate indicator of the actual frequency, and nature, of civil litigation in 
Canterbury, and that is the number of matters which came before the 
Supreme Court either in its civil list sittings, or were dealt with in Chambers by 
the Supreme Court Judge.  This method of counting allows us to take into 
account the estate and lunatic cases, as well as assessing  interlocutory 
matters and the mainstay of Canterbury lawyers, applications for an order for 
judgment for moneys due.  A count of the cases on this basis produces the 
following estimates;  
Defended matters  set down for hearing 34  
Interlocutory and procedural applications  120  
Estates 82 
Orders for judgment 255. 
 
Those figures need further to be clarified; the first orders for judgment are in 
January 1859,  but no more are made until July 1859;  after that date, as 
discussed in section 5, these orders dominate the work of the Supreme Court. 
 
In attempting to assess the volume of litigation, it must also be noted that 
there were occasional instances of interlocutory  or interpleader matters which 
were heard in the Supreme Court in Canterbury, even though it is clear the 
matter related primarily to matters external to the settlement.14  The numbers 
                                                          
13 NZNA CAHX Ch53/53A Register of Supreme Court Writs.  
14  See for example Osborne and Cushing v Macandrew   26 February 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B 
Minute Book 1860-61 (interpleader matter as to ownership of goods seized on a writ of execution in a 
matter between  Melbourne and  Dunedin merchants.  A second case, McNulty v Macandrew,  dealt 
with on the same day, raised essentially the same issues. Another Otago-centred case is Young v 
Berney 1 November 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60.  
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of such cases are  small in absolute terms, and it seems at least possible that 
there are “Canterbury” cases in other registries against which they should be 
offset.   
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4. Defended cases  
4.1 Clash of norms  
One of the most interesting features of the defended cases is that in at least 
two, the matter appears to have gone to court as a result of a clash between 
what we may call formal law, and the  practices and customs of the settlers.  
The two cases which to my mind exemplify this are Anderson v Harrison15   
and Dalgety, Buckley & Co v Cameron16. 
 
In Anderson v Harrison the plaintiff had been contracted to saw a very 
substantial amount of lumber from trees on the defendant’s land. However 
when the contracted cut was almost complete, the sawn timber was largely 
consumed by fire.  The plaintiff sought payment for the timber so lost; the 
defendant insisted that property in the timber had not passed, so the plaintiff 
had not delivered the contracted amount, and was not entitled to payment.  
Although I suspect most English lawyers would have considered that the 
sawyer had retained title to the timber,  the plaintiff asserted that the custom 
was that once the sawn timber was stacked, it became the property of the 
contracting party. Other sawyers gave evidence of a similar custom, and the 
jury awarded the sawyer the £409 claimed. 
 
That case can usefully be compared with the rather simpler issue in  Dalgety, 
Buckley & Co v Cameron where the plaintiff merchants sued Cameron, a ship 
captain, for damage to a cargo, carried by the defendant, which was damaged 
by seawater following the grounding of the defendant’s ship on the river bar at 
the mouth of the River Avon. Under the common law, and indeed under 
statute, a carrier was generally liable for damage to goods while in the 
carrier’s care; here however the jury appears very quickly to have accepted 
the evidence of the defendant and three local merchants that it was a 
customary term of contracts for shipping goods between Christchurch and 
Lyttelton that the goods were at the shipper’s risk, and the carrier was only 
liable if negligence was established.  
 
4.2. Of damages 
A small number of cases seem to have been fairly straightforward  disputes in 
the nature of contracts, where it is perhaps only the need to establish the 
particular damages claimed that had led to the case coming before the court 
at all.  In this bracket we may include a number of cases in 1861. Perhaps the 
most interesting is Hargreaves v Fantham 17 where Joseph Fantham, a miller 
and apparently the most frequently sued man in Canterbury, was found liable 
in damages to the tune of £224 for delivering only a fifth of a promised 50 tons 
of flour. It seems likely the case went to a hearing only to force the plaintiff to 
establish  the losses claimed, which it appears had been incurred in acquiring 
a substitute cargo from Wellington, at a higher price, and in shipping it down.  
                                                          
15 5 March 1860 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860,  reported Lyttelton 
Times 7 and 10 March 1860. 
16 1 June 1860  NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61, reported by   Lyttelton Times 10 June 
1860. 
17
 27 June 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61, reported by   Lyttelton Times 3 July 
1861 and The Press  5 July The costs of the action were taxed at a very substantial 39-7-8; not 
surprisingly given Fantham’s frequent appearances as a judgment debtor, execution was levied a month 
later against the person. 
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In many other cases it is difficult to see how the jury came to their view of the 
damages to be awarded.  In the otherwise straightforward case of Marshall v 
Giggs18 the plaintiff complained that a dray and four draught bullock 
purchased for £110  was not delivered; instead the plaintiff received an 
inferior dray and  but two bullocks. As a result the plaintiff was put to 
expenses, detailed at around £40, in hiring carters to move materials.  
Damages of £150 were awarded, suggesting that the jury had given not 
merely the extra costs but also the entire capital sum.  
 
Such apparent generosity is also to be suspected in Evans v Millton19 where 
the plaintiff recovered very substantial damages for an alleged breach of trust 
by the defendant, who on non-payment of moneys owed to him by the plaintiff 
had not sued on the dishonoured promissory notes but instead sold 50 acres 
of land which, the jury found, had been conveyed to him only as security for 
the debt.  The plaintiff was awarded £1250 for this breach, despite the fact the 
defendant had received but £1,000 for the land, and despite evidence that 
even that price would not be achieved if the land was sold for cash at the time 
of the trial. It is tempting to speculate here as to why the award was so 
substantial; it may be hypothesised that the special jury, which as ever 
included a number of merchants, was well aware of the fragile edifice of credit 
on which the settlement depended, and was concerned to see that legal forms 
and requirements for action against debtors were carefully followed.  
 
Not all plaintiffs were so successful.  In another case20 a disappointed 
purchaser of land alleged the boundaries of the “run” being bought had been 
deliberately misrepresented by the vendor, with the consequence the value of 
improvements by way of a house and stockyards were lost;  the purchaser 
sought £2,000 in general damages; and £1,000 in special damages. Although 
he received only £800 from the jury, this must be set against the purchase 
price of £500.  
 
There were also a small number of cases where it is clear the real gravamen 
of the case was not any figure in damages, although damages may have 
been claimed, but the vindication of a claimed title to property,21 or of the 
plaintiff’s character (as in the defamation actions mentioned earlier, or the 
case of Baker v Schroder). In one or two cases it is difficult not to see the real 
motivation as personal ill-feeling.  Included in this latter class are Simms v 
Holland 22 where the plaintiff was suing a former business partner for allowing 
                                                          
18
 30 September 1861, NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61 ; reported Lyttelton Times 2 
October 1861 and The Press, 5 October 5 1861. 
19 6-8 September 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; reported 
Lyttelton Times 12 September 1860. 
20
 Collier v Caton  2 October 1861, NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61; reported The Press, 
October 5 1861 and Lyttelton Times 9 October 1861.  
21
 In this category come such cases as Wyatt v Slack & le Fleming 1 October 1861, NZNA CAHX 
CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61; reported The Press, October 5 1861 and Lyttelton Times 9 October 
1861 where  the plaintiff sought, and received, effectively nominal damages for trespass onto lands the 
plaintiff occupied under a pastoral licence; the defendants claimed the land was included within their 
licensed lands. 
22 5 September 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 reported Lyttelton 
Times 8 September 1860. 
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the escape of a horse which the defendant was allegedly to have sold on the 
plaintiff’s behalf, and a case in trespass to a flour mill.23  
 
4.3. Cases seeking equitable remedies 
One of the notable features of the cases before the courts is the comparative 
dearth of applications for equitable remedies.  These are discussed further in 
section 8, below, but it is notable that there is but one  application for an order 
for specific performance of a contract, and only  a handful of  actions for 
injunctions.  It is not clear why this occurs, but in the early years it  may be 
presumed the absence of a resident Judge meant such equitable relief would 
rarely be sought;  in the later years it may simply have been that in general at 
least one major reason must have been the rapidity with which cases could be 
brought. The shortest delay appears to have been the period of just over a 
month from an alleged breach of contract to a jury verdict for the plaintiff24;  in 
March 1861 a case for damages for “illegal and forcible entry” onto the 
plaintiff’s premises was heard less than two months after the cause of action 
arose.25  
 
4.4. Other defended cases 
One of the most tantalising cases,  notable for the remarkable brevity of the 
reporting in both the contemporary newspapers, is the one action for 
seduction in the period, Houlihan v Harston26 where the plaintiff sought 
damages of £500, alleging the defendant, a prominent Lyttelton solicitor,27  
had seduced his daughter.28  In most Supreme Court cases, even civil cases, 
the newspapers printed at least a précis of the evidence of the witnesses; in 
this case there is no such reportage, and merely an indication that after two 
days of evidence, the jury were unable, despite a lengthy retirement, to agree 
on a verdict; the case was later settled out of court.  It is tempting to ascribe 
this reticence more to Harston’s influential connections than to any Victorian 
reserve.  
 
                                                          
23 Stephens v Woodford, see section 5.3 below.  
24
 Marshall v Giggs  30 September 1861, NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61 ; reported 
Lyttelton Times 2 October 1861 and The Press, 5 October 5 1861. 
25 Stephens v Woodford 7 and 8 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 
1860-61, reported Lyttelton Times 13 March 1861. In that case a re-trial was granted; that was 
completed only four months after the first trial: Stephens v Woodford 8 July 1861 NZNA CAHX 
CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 reported Lyttelton Times 10 July 1861 and The Press, 
July 13 1861. 
26
 1 July 1861, NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61; reported The Press 6 July 1861 and 
Lyttelton Times 10 July 1861. 
27
 Edward Frederick Buttemer Harston had qualified as a solicitor by serving articles to an attorney  in 
England, which articles were later transferred to a New Zealand solicitor. He was admitted in new 
Zealand in 1859,  and quickly acquired a very substantial practice in Lyttelton, often appearing for 
merchant firms seeking judgment orders against debtors. He later sought to be struck of the roll as a 
solicitor so he could seek admission to the English bar, but some years later was re-admitted as a 
solicitor in New Zealand.. See documents filed in  NZNA CAHX CH 244/1  Index of Barristers and 
Solicitors (Christchurch) "prior to 1876". 
28
 The relevant Supreme Court Rules, the Regulae Generales of 1856 contained a specific rule, Rule 
89, relating to the pleading of seduction actions, whereby the plaintiff (who had to be the father of the girl 
allegedly seduced or another male in loco parentis) needed only to aver that the victim was under 21 
years of age; there was no need to plead or prove she was employed by the plaintiff or that plaintiff had 
suffered any loss. 
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A more unusual action, and one which would not now be classed as a civil 
litigation although it was heard in the civil sittings of the Supreme Court is 
McKellar v Craig,29 where McKellar was suing to recover a penalty under the 
Customs legislation for an alleged fraudulent evasion of duty in relation to a 
shipment of tea; the action failed in the face of the defendant’s strong denials 
of any fraud and assertions that the admitted error as to the weight of tea was 
one of which he was unaware at the time the relevant customs declaration 
was made.  It may also be pertinent to note that the jury in this case, as with 
almost all Canterbury special juries, contained a significant number of 
merchants in a substantial way of business. We may speculate that they, as 
importers themselves, would have been reluctant to see actions for customs 
penalties become common. A final feature of this case is that once the verdict 
was given Craig, the successful defendant, discontinued an action against 
McKellar which had been set down for the same day. The grounds for that 
action are not discoverable, but it is interesting, and not a little curious, that 
the defendant’s Craig’s costs in the discontinued action were taxed at almost 
double those he recovered as the successful party in the case that went to a 
hearing.30  
 
5. Judgment orders 
5.1. Nature and origins  
In 1859 the Supreme Court was presented for the first time with an application 
for an order for judgment.  This form of application would appear to have been 
based on Rule 307 of the Regulae Generales of 1856, which allowed plaintiff 
to move for judgment if no plea or demurrer had been filed in reply to a 
plaintiff’s writ within the permitted time.  This procedure roughly corresponds 
with the modern summary judgment, except that the plaintiff did not have to 
show there was no arguable defence to the action. (The rule was also 
productive of a steady trickle of procedural applications to permit a plea or 
demurrer to be filed out of time). The first instance of judgment orders  comes 
in January 1859, where a sheepfarmer recovered, on a order for judgment  
two different sums of around £120 from a Christchurch butcher.31 There 
appears to be no reason why it should have taken more than two years from 
the enactment of the Regulae Generales for such orders to be sought.  
 
The cases in which judgments were sought under Rule 307 must be coupled 
with the less frequent but still quite common cases where the defendant’s 
response to a writ for a sum of for money was to file, under Rule 422, a 
cognovit or confession of action. This process was only possible where the 
defendant had received legal advice; the principal benefit of such a step 
appears to have been in minimising court costs.  
 
The judgment order procedure was, almost exclusively, used to recover 
moneys due, whether  by way of a contractual sum, or repayment of moneys 
                                                          
29 1 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; reported The Press July 6 
1861 and Lyttelton Times 10 July 1861. 
30 See McKellar v Craig 4 July 1861.  The taxed costs awarded to McKellar on the abandoned claim 
were £36-7-8 as against the £21-7-4 to be paid to Craig for his successful defence in the other matter.  
McKellar recovered his money by execution against goods some six months later.. 
31 White v Slee 21 January 1859  NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860. 
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lent.  The qualification as to “almost exclusively”  must be made to take note 
of one case where the judgment order was for possession of land.32  
 
In general it is not possible from existing records to determine which actions 
related to payment of contractual sums and which were, in effect, for 
repayment of loans and the like. In only one is an indication given clearly, 
where the case is described as being brought on a bill of exchange.33  The 
largest sum on a judgment order appears to have been Miles & Co v Le 
Cren34 where the defendant confessed, through his attorney, liability for 
£6,000; such an action was, almost certainly, an action in debt rather than 
contract.  By contrast, the smallest claim shown on the record was for a mere 
7/1 owing in interest to the Union Bank; the costs in the matter were taxed at 
over £12.35   Other smaller claims  included  actions in November 1860 by 
Wellington traders for sums of £7-7-0 and £1136  and although such claims as 
these may be exceptional,  it is clear that a very substantial percentage of the 
total summary judgment cases involved claims below £40 in value.  Not a few 
of these  smaller claims were brought by working class people, probably in 
many cases as actions for unpaid wages.37   
 
5.2. The plaintiffs 
Who brought all these actions for judgment orders? 
The majority of the approximately 250 judgment orders  made in 1859-1861 
were sought by individual plaintiffs who appear only once or twice in the lists 
of cases; these ranged, as we may see, from labourers and farmers to 
traders. However there is a very notable subset of cases in which the 
individuals who sought judgment orders were merchants of one kind or 
another. This phenomenon starts comparatively early on – the first large batch 
of judgment orders on 8 July 1859 included three cases brought by a single 
merchant, Louis Edward Nathan of Christchurch.  Four identifiable merchants 
or merchant firms between them account for almost 20% of the judgment 
orders; other merchants who brought fewer actions certainly take the total 
past the 25% mark.38 
 
It is notable that a significant strand of cases are to be found where workmen 
are suing their apparent social betters. We may take as a elegant example of 
this apparent social contrast the entitulature of one summary judgment case 
in 1860,where the parties are described as “William Lingberton and John 
Donovan of Worsley’s Bush, bushmen v Henry Tuft Worsley, of Worsley’s 
Bush, gentleman”.39  The bushmen succeeded in recovering a judgment for 
                                                          
32 Wortley v Williams 5 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
33 Lucas, acting branch manager of Union Bank of Australia at Christchurch v Goodacre 16 March 1860 
Mbk 1. 
34 18 May 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
35 Palmer, as manager Christchurch branch, Union Bank of Australia v Turner 1 February 1861 NZNA 
CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61. 
36 Hamersley v  Hore 30 November 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61 and Cook  v J 
W Moorhouse. 30 November 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61, respectively. 
37 See for example  McCormick v O’Neill 30 November 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 
Supreme Court 1860-61. 
38 The highest tallies come from Dalgety Buckley & Co and E A Hargreaves, with 14 apiece, JT Peacock 
& Co with 11 and Nathan with 10.  
39 Lingberton and Donovan v Worsley 10 February 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme 
Court 1852-60. 
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£64,  which was probably a sum due for either clearing forest or sawing 
timber, or perhaps both. No order for execution was ever made, so it may be 
the claim was settled or compromised. 
 
Only a small number of cases were brought by female plaintiffs.  A 
Christchurch linen draper, Jane Skillicorn, recovered a judgment against a 
local solicitor in 1860 for a sum in excess of £100, which suggests the amount 
due was not merely for goods supplied.40  Other cases by female plaintiffs 
were Healey v Barnard41 (an action for the round figure of  £80, which 
suggests it was for a loan rather than a contract sum) and Dillon v 
Lawrence,42. Dillon was described as a lodging house keeper, and the 
judgment sum, £27-16-7, may well have been for accommodation. 
 
It would also appear that plaintiffs were generally of full age – I found only one 
case where a the real plaintiff was a minor.43  
 
In this context we may note that there appears to be not a single case where 
a Maori was involved, as either plaintiff or defendant, in Supreme Court 
proceedings.   There is one case where an Asian labourer, from the details 
given as to his address one of a number brought to Christchurch by a retired 
Indian Army officer, sought a judgment order against a miller;  the cause of 
action is not discoverable.44  
 
5.3. The defendants 
There are also a number of instances where it is clear that a defendant had 
been living very much on undeserved credit, and once one creditor sought 
judgment, others moved as quickly as they might to seek to secure their 
interests. 
 
A classic example of this process is the unfortunate William Henderson, a 
hotelkeeper of Akaroa, who in July 1859 was sued successfully by a number 
of traders  including one merchant who succeeded in getting two judgment 
orders (for a total of over £300 in principal and interest)45  a cooper,46  a 
draper47 and, most strikingly, another merchant who sought the very large 
sum of £500.48 In this last case execution, ordered against the person, was 
delayed for more than five years. At least one more action was filed, though 
                                                          
40 Skillicorn v Hodgson 10 August 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61.  
Skillicorn was in a large enough way of business to advertise prominently in the newspapers, see for 
example Lyttelton Times 6 June 1860.  
41 10 February 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
42 21 September 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
43 Quinty v Healey 23 August 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61, 
where the Court was asked for an order to allow one Alfred Dunn to sue Catherine Healey on Anne 
Quinty’s behalf. The cause of action is not, as yet, discoverable. 
44 Shoree Singh v Ashby 30 August 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
The sum sought was £53-15-0 and interest and costs. 
45 Alport v Henderson 16 July 1859 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860. 
46 Raymond v Henderson 16 July 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
47 Moss v Henderson 17 August 1859 £30 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
48 Dransfield v Henderson 17 August 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-
60. 
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apparently judgment was never sought.49  A year later Henderson, then 
described as a ”yeoman” was sued by another Christchurch merchant, this 
time for the less spectacular, but still substantial sum of £133.50  
 
A slightly less direct example would appear to be that of Charles Edward 
Fooks, “gentleman” of Christchurch who in March 1861 was sued by a firm a 
firm of solicitors;51 in July of that year by a brewer (who obtained two separate 
judgment orders on a single day)52 as well as by two different merchants53  
and, in September 1861, by another lawyer who sought to recover 
professional fees.54  In this case it seems highly probable that the litigation 
against Fooks had been triggered by the convictions for embezzlement in 
December 1860  of what must have been a close relative, Charles Berjew 
Fooks, former Secretary of the Waste Lands Board.55   
 
The occasionally precarious finances of many leading Canterbury figures is 
best illustrated by William Sefton Moorhouse, formerly elected Superintendent 
of the Canterbury Province, who was successfully sued several times in 1860, 
and was clearly unable to satisfy the judgments in cash, as execution was 
levied against his goods.  
 
There were also a steady trickle of cases, usually involving relatively small 
amounts, brought by merchants against tradesmen, such as Gould and Miles 
v Rees.56 Rees, at various times described as a painter, glazier and 
paperhanger,  was defendant in half a dozen cases over 1859-61. A second 
example is Gould and Miles v von Gartner57 here the defendant Gustav von 
Gartner, was a German, naturalised in the Naturalization Act 1854 who 
traded, apparently not very successfully, as a timber merchant  
 
Butchers were not infrequently defendants in cases brought by sheepfarmers 
or stockowners, which certainly suggests the butchers may have been less 
than punctilious in paying for livestock received.  One such case resulted in a 
defended hearing; others were simply dealt with under the summary judgment 
process.58  
                                                          
49 Barnard v Henderson 16 July 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. The 
plaintiff here was an auctioneer. 
50 Nathan v Henderson 3 July 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
51 Wyatt and Harston v Fooks 13 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 
1860-61. 
52 Taylor v Fooks 29 June 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 (two 
orders totalling over £110). 
53 J  Dann and F A Bishop, t/a  Dann and Bishop v Fooks (principal sum £71, plus interest of £45, which 
indicates a debt of very considerable antiquity) ;  
Hargreaves v Fooks 29 June 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 
(£226) 
54 Dampier v Fooks 13 September 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 
(suing for fees as taxed). 
55 R v Fooks 7 December 1860 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; reported 
Lyttelton Times 8 December 1860. Dampier, who was counsel at the first of CB Fooks’s trials, was the 
lawyer seeking to recover professional fees in September 1861. 
56 9 September 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
57 9 September 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
58 See for example Millton v Slee 30 August 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 
1852-60; Cookson v H Brown and E Campbell, t/a Brown and Campbell 10 February  1860 NZNA 
CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60; Carew v Joyce 24 February 1860 NZNA CAHX 
CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
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One of the recurrent features of the entire period is the frequency of actions 
against  flour millers – and in particular against one miller, Joseph Fantham, 
who was sued by thirteen different plaintiffs in his individual capacity in the 
years 1859-1861; in addition a partnership between himself and W T 
Stephens was sued by three other plaintiffs.59  Most of these actions arose out 
of his trade as a miller, but one was brought by Richard Woodford, from whom 
he had at one time bought an interest in a mill. To complete the picture, it 
must be noted that W T Stephens, at different times a business partner of 
both Fantham and Woodford succeeded, albeit at a re-trial, in gaining £50 as 
damages in an action against Woodford for trespass on the mill when seeking 
satisfaction for the debt owed by Fantham.60  Woodford himself had also on 
occasion been the subject of judgment orders.  
 
6 Litigants  
Millers were far from the only colonists who found themselves at different 
ends of the legal process. William Robert Cator, described in 1859 as being a 
commission agent of Christchurch, successfully sued a Charles Andrew 
Freeland “gentleman” of Christchurch for £95 in July 1859,61 but was himself 
sued by various creditors in 1860, when he is described as a farmer.  
 
Another figure, who appears frequently as a plaintiff, and less so as a 
defendant, is the lawyer, Charles Edward Dampier  who has already been 
mentioned as the plaintiff in two cases in the first sittings of the Supreme 
Court in Christchurch in 185262 and as the applicant for mandatory orders in 
1861. This were far from his only appearances as in both 1859 and 1860 he 
had had successful actions for judgment orders brought against him in  and in 
1861 we see him seeking to recover professional fees by way of an order that 
he be awarded the sum determined by the registrar of the Supreme Court 
after taxation of his bill of costs.63  On the same day as that application was 
made,  Dampier also was successful in obtaining a judgment order against a 
Lyttelton farmer; given that the farmer in question had recently had a number 
of judgment orders made against him, it may be that this case too was for 
professional fees.64 
 
 
7 Of fees and costs  
It is not possible to work out what proportion of the costs awarded by the 
courts in the simple chambers actions were intended to reflect out of pocket 
costs and what portion was in effect the lawyer’s fee. In the vast majority of 
these cases taxed costs awarded were in the £12 - £14 range. It seems likely 
                                                          
59 Although no other individual can rival Fantham in the number of individual cases brought against him, 
Alexander Webb, a Christchurch wharfinger, came close with nine, and the total sums claimed from 
Webb may even have surpassed Fantham’s total. 
60 Stephens v Woodford 7-8 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61; 
reported Lyttelton Times,13 March 1861;  the retrial was 8 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute 
Book Supreme Court 1860-61; reported  Lyttelton Times 10 July 1860 and The Press, July 13 1861. 
61 Cator v Freeland 22 July 1859 NZNA CAHX CH53/21 Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-60. 
62 Section 3.1 above. 
63 Dampier v Fooks 13 September 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
For the vicissitudes of Fooks see  section 5.3. 
64 Dampier v Heron 13 September 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
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from the tables of current fees that official fees to be paid would not have 
exceeded  £3 or £4 or at the outside £5 (even with extra folios of documents 
at 6d per 72 words!);  execution costs and the costs of taxation itself might 
have added perhaps £2 or £3 more, at most. This would appear to leave a 
substantial margin for the lawyers. It may be that these calculations are too 
favourable to the lawyers, but if costs other than fees were, say, 75% of the 
normal taxed costs rather than 50-60%, the fee component would still have 
been £3 or £4. To have even a few of these cases each month would provide, 
one would think, a reasonable income. 
These calculations may be compared with another datum which gives some 
indication of the fees contemporary lawyers considered a reasonable return 
for their labours (or, perhaps more accurately, had persuaded the New 
Zealand Parliament was a reasonable return). This is provided by the District 
Courts Act 1858, which provided a regime whereby a solicitors for both parties 
were, in effect guaranteed at least 3 guineas for each case, in addition to out 
of pocket costs.65  
 
7.1  Rules as to costs 
It would seem highly likely that one aspect of the popularity with plaintiffs, and 
lawyers acting for plaintiffs, of the summary judgment process was that the 
successful plaintiff was entitled to recover costs – which were very often a 
substantial element of the total for which judgment was entered; these costs 
must, I think, have included a substantial element of professional fees.  Under 
the Regulae Generales of 1856,66 Rule 172,a plaintiff in an action for money 
(or to recover land or chattels) was to receive costs if he or she was 
successful won on substantial issue and got 40/- or more67. If however the 
plaintiff was not successful on all issues, costs were apportioned between the 
issues on which the respective parties succeeded. Rule 173 makes it clear 
that costs of Counsel were also to be apportioned in this way, which implies 
that counsel’s costs were normally awarded to a successful plaintiff.  Insofar 
as this was the case, the plaintiff had the satisfaction of knowing that if the 
judgment could be satisfied, the defendant was, in effect, paying not only the 
debt due but for the plaintiff’s legal expenses in getting judgment.  
 
7.2. Contingency fees? 
Two side-issues which I have not, at least not yet, been able to resolve are 
whether lawyers in Canterbury in effect operated a contingency fee system, of 
bringing these cases on the basis that the plaintiff would not be asked to pay 
                                                          
65
 Under s55  a plaintiff’s solicitor was entitled to recover out of pocket costs in all cases, and where the 
plaintiff was  successful, a fee based on 5% of the sum for which judgment was given, subject however 
to always getting the 3 guinea minimum, win or lose. Solicitors for the defence were well provided for: 
s56 again guaranteed out of pocket costs, and if the defendant succeeded, the solicitor could receive 
5% of the sum for which the summons was issued. If the plaintiff succeeded, the defendant’s solicitor 
again got 5% of the sum for which judgment was given, again subject to the three guinea minimum, win 
or lose. 
66
 These were made under the Supreme Court Procedure Act 1856, and replaced a much briefer code 
of procedure put into effect in 1846.  
67
 It is notable that in cases where only nominal damages were sought (as in Wyatt v Slack & le Fleming 
1 October 1861, NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61; reported The Press, October 5 1861 
and Lyttelton Times 9 October 1861) or where the plaintiff and defendant agreed judgment would be 
entered for the plaintiff, plaintiffs were careful to stipulate for, and were successful in receiving, the 40/- 
minimum.  
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any professional fee,  and what happened in cases where no successful 
execution of the judgment debt was possible.  
On the former of these questions, I note that on occasions the principal sum 
claimed was  less than the costs awarded –the cases noted above in section 
5.1. certainly suggest cases were pursued where a plaintiff who was funding 
the case could hardly find the action worthwhile.  
 
There may well have been some enthusiasm among would-be plaintiffs for 
lawyers to fund the bringing of proceedings – in July 1861 a correspondent to 
a Christchurch newspaper deplored a rumoured rise in Court fees, arguing 
that colonial circumstances made it mandatory to leave property or funds in 
the hands of trustees or agents; if these persons defaulted in some way, the 
same defalcations that gave grounds for the owner of the property to sue 
could also leave the owner in financial difficulties which prevented payment fo 
the requisite fees.68  
 
8. Procedural matters and injunctions  
In among the applications for judgment, there were an increasing number of 
interlocutory matters, principally applications for an extension of time to  plead 
to writs, or to amend the pleadings in a case filed (such applications might 
come from either party). Curiously, despite the frequency with which writs  
were issued but no proceedings are ever minuted, there seem to be but two 
cases where defendants sought to strike out actions against them for want of 
prosecution, and both such cases come on the same day, at the end of our 
sample.69   
 
In only two cases did plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent defendants 
dissipating assets prior to adjudication of the dispute.70  In other cases, again 
only a handful over the years studied, the plaintiff sought a different form of 
security by seeking to have the defendant arrested prior to determination of 
the case.71   
 
The only other example of injunctive relief being sought appears to be one 
effectively relating to land title, where a runholder sought an injunction to 
prevent the Commissioners for Waste lands from “interfering” with his run; 
they have arranged for the impounding of 6,000 sheep on  a part of the run 
claimed by other graziers.72 There  was also one case where an unsuccessful 
                                                          
68
 “A Cosmopolite” The Press, July 6 1861. 
69 Gladstone v Millton 30 August 1861  and Alport v Simchell 30 August 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B 
Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
70 See for example Hornbrook v Parkinson 15 March 1859 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book 
Supreme Court 1852-1860, where the defendant was enjoined from selling horses until a bill of 
exchange had been honoured, and  Collier v Caton 12 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 
Supreme Court 1860-61 where the plaintiff, who later succeeded in getting damages for 
misrepresentation as to the boundaries of a pastoral run purchased from the vendor, successfully 
sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from “negotiating a bill of exchange for £250-0-0 dated 
about 25 April 1861, drawn by defendant and accepted by plaintiff payable at Union Bank of Australia, 
Lyttelton branch, on 21 September” until further order of the court. 
71 See for example Templer v Phillips 22 March 1859 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme 
Court 1852-1860; Giggs v Wilkins 4 April 1859 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 
1852-1860. 
72 McLean v Brittan 5 March 1859 CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 1852-1860. Although 
the case was heard in chambers, the Lyttelton Times reported the fact of the hearing on 9 March 1859 
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defendant sought to prohibit the sheriff from distraining on his goods to satisfy 
a judgment order, although there the injunction granted was discharged the 
following day at the request of his counsel.73 
 
Nor were other mandatory orders commonly sought. There were only two  
applications for mandatory orders in the nature of prerogative writs, both 
brought by the same plaintiff, Charles Dampier,  a lawyer and frequent litigant,  
who in June 1861 successfully sought to set aside an arbitration award74  and 
some months later sought, unsuccessfully,  a writ of prohibition against a 
Resident Magistrate to prevent a case against Dampier proceeding, although 
the nature of the latter case is not known.75   
 
9. Satisfying judgment – execution against goods and against the 
person 
9.1 Methods of enforcement 
Obtaining judgment against a debtor for a sum of money was, of course, only 
part of the problem for any creditor.  Then came the task of recovering the 
money, or its value. There were only two effective measures  - “execution 
against goods” (that is, to seize assets of the defendant and sell them to 
satisfy the judgment and costs) or execution against the person (effectively 
imprisonment for debt). It is clear from contemporary newspapers that an 
order for execution “against the goods” of a defendant  did not in fact mean 
the Sheriff was limited to seizure of chattels – advertisements for sheriff’s 
sales (which listed the names of the parties to the relevant action) include the 
sale not merely of household goods, stock in trade and livestock but also book 
debts and even a leasehold interest in land.  
 
While the Regulae Generales allowed execution 14 clear days after judgment, 
it is normal to see a rather longer time elapse. It is interesting that the first 
case in which the minimum time was allowed to elapse was one where the 
Sheriff of Christchurch, the person in charge of levying execution, was,in his 
private capacity, the judgment creditor!76  Again, there seems to have been 
some degree of change in practice, here, as in 1859, it was common for the 
summary judgment to provide that execution be stayed for 21 days.77  
 
9.2. Interpleaders and absent defendants  
In a small number of cases78 (one in three disputes arose as to the 
entitlements to goods seized, and the court was required to determine, on an 
interpleader summons, who was entitled to the goods in question. Most such 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(the only discovered incident of such a report), and the next issue, on 12 March 1859 gave a very full 
report of the chambers argument  which the newspaper said had been supplied to it,perhaps by one of 
the lawyers involved. 
73 ex parte Henry Jackson 12 July 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
74 ex parte Dampier 29 June 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. 
75 Ex parte Dampier  13 September 1861 mbk 2. 
76 Maude v J W Moorhouse and T G D Holland, t/a Moorhouse & Holland 14 September 1860 NZNA 
CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61. 
77 See for example Nathan v Warner I July 1859 NZNA CAHX CH 53/21  Minute Book Supreme Court 
1852-1860. In that case execution was not in fact levied for 9 months. 
78  One in 1859, three in each of 1860 and 1861.  
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cases appear to have been settled between the parties; where this did not 
happen the Court held a summary hearing to determine the issues.79   
 
There was also a special procedure under the Absent Defendants Act 1858 
whereby a plaintiff  who sued a defendant who had left the jurisdiction could 
seek satisfaction against funds of the defendant held by any person in the 
colony. The procedure was complex, apparently as a way of safeguarding the 
rights of the absent defendant – and there is but one example of an 
application under the Act in the Canterbury Minute book, an action by a 
William Henry Valpy, an Otago run-holder against Sir William Congreve, 
baronet, for £750, of which Valpy sought to recover just over £200 which was 
in the hands of a Christchurch merchant. He was ultimately successful, but 
the process required four separate court appearances, and the furnishing of a 
bond for £500 as security in case the judgment in his favour was vacated on 
appeal.80  
 
9.3 Execution in practice  
Many judgment creditors appear never to have enforced the judgment – or so 
one must assume from the fact that the record of a judgment in the creditor’s 
favour is not accompanied by any order for execution, nor are costs in the 
matter taxed.  The proportions of such un-executed judgments varies 
significantly from  about 25% of all judgments in the first half of 1860  to 
almost half of the judgments in 1861.  
 
 Two quite different phenomena may explain a failure to enforce a judgment. 
Firstly there may well have been a number of cases where the judgment 
creditor was able to use the fact of judgment, and the prospect of the recovery 
of significant further sums by way of costs, as a lever to extract payment, or at 
least partial payment from the debtor.  The second possibility is that the 
judgment creditor simply found that the costs of execution would be wasted, 
because there was no real prospect of recovering even the judgment sum.  
This may well have been the case in a number of instances where other 
creditors had already  succeeded in getting orders for execution against 
goods or against the person of the creditor. 
 
It is significant, perhaps, that in a small number of cases execution occurred 
only after a substantial lapse of time – perhaps after negotiations for payment 
broke down, or more likely after the debtor had managed somehow to 
accumulate enough wealth to make execution worthwhile.  The most extreme 
case of this was one where execution was levied more than six years after the 
initial judgment.81   
 
                                                          
79 See for example the hearing on 21 December 1860 of the dispute between Mills and  Brittan as to 
ownership of goods seized on fi fa in Brittan v von Gartner ; the decision in favour of Mills was delivered 
4 January 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61. 
80 See Valpy v Congreve, variously 10 December 1860; 28 February 1861,  15 March 1861 and 19 June 
1861; ; NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61.   
81 Hargreaves v McBratney  21 December 1860 ; NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61.   Such 
a procedure required a special order form the Court under R 196 of the Regulae Generales, which 
Hagreaves apparently received on 15 March 1867. 
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One interesting change in early 1861 is that execution against the person 
which had hitherto only been sought where execution against goods had 
failed to satisfy the judgment comes instead to be the first form of execution 
ordered. There appears to be no legal basis for this change, and it may simply 
have been a change of practice – perhaps dictated by the known state of 
affluence of the judgment debtor.82  Most peculiarly, there is one case in 1861 
where execution against goods was ordered only after execution against the 
person had been tried without satisfaction of the debt.83   
Another curious feature is to find a case where one solicitor sought a 
judgment order against another member of the profession, with the order 
being enforced by execution against the person.84  
 
 
10. Conclusion 
While this study cannot claim to have covered the entire field of litigation in 
the early years of the Canterbury settlement, it does establish certain features 
of the period and the community which may used as the basis for 
comparisons with litigation in other communities and at other times. 
One of the primary matters for any comparative study is the need to 
determine the definitions to be used in determining the quantum of litigation. It 
is contended that unless account is taken of the very considerable amount of 
chambers work, and the use of such procedures as the judgment orders 
which have loomed large in this study, no complete picture can be 
established.  
Secondly, it is clear from the Canterbury experience that litigation in the 
Supreme Court was open to a very wide sector of colonial society, even 
though clearly mercantile interests made most use of it. The role of lawyers in 
promoting, facilitating and,perhaps, funding access for the working class 
plaintiffs is deserving of very much more study.  
Thirdly,  in considering the incidence of litigation and the characteristics of 
litigants in colonial society, it is essential not merely to consider the classes of 
regular plaintiffs, but also the people who became frequent defendants, either 
as a result of one major event or as chronic debtors sued on many occasions 
over a period of year. Nor should any study neglect the people who appear 
both as plaintiffs and as defendants; the classes are not mutually exclusive. 
                                                          
82 The first such case is Parkerson v Inwood 1 February 1861; NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 
1860-61. Inwood, a Christchurch fellmonger, had had four orders made against him in the previous year.  
Inwood was later imprisoned at the instance of another judgment creditor a month later - Miles t/a Gould 
and Miles v Inwood, 15 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61.  However in the 
second case where execution against the person was the first order made, Peacock and Buchanan t/a J 
T Peacock & Co v Dean 15 February 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61 there is no 
prior record of suits in the Supreme Court; this does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the 
defendant was known to be impecunious.  Execution was not levied for six weeks in that case, which 
does suggest that perhaps other avenues for satisfaction of the debt had been tried first.   
83 McFarlane v McBratney  22 July 1861 ; NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book 1860-61.  McBratney 
was a regular defendant in such cases – being sued twice in 1860 and four times in 1861 – but this was 
the only occasion on which execution against the person was ordered. 
84  Bamford v Patten 19 March 1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61. It is 
probable the dispute here was for a debt, of some £74-17-0,  as the defendant had previously been 
articled to the plaintiff. See documents in NZNA CAHX CH 244/1  Index of Barristers and Solicitors 
(Christchurch) "prior to 1876". For Patten’s later career see Finn "The Early Years of an Unregulated 
Profession : Lawyers in the South Island 1850-1869" (1995) 6 Canterbury LR 56, 65.  There is another 
case of what appears to have been a simple debt action between solicitors: Wormald v Hodgson 5 July 
1861 NZNA CAHX CH53/22B Minute Book Supreme Court 1860-61 (order for judgment for £60). 
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Lastly, it is suggested that a proper understanding of the impact of litigation 
requires us to ascertain what we can about the processes of enforcement of 
judgments, and the social or economic factors affecting this.  
I hope this paper will both stimulate discussion of these matters and 
encourage similar studies of other jurisdictions and periods.  
 
